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Structured Abstract 
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to explore the robustness of the emerging body of knowledge about 
collaborative supply chains in the context of Engineered-to-Order manufacturing engineering project systems. 
Design/methodology/approach: This paper uses an evolutionary classification technique to build an evolutionary 
history for an industry case study: the French Engineered to Order machine design industry. 
Findings:  The evolutionary history shows that collaborative forms of governance have been used in this industry 
after an era of failed transactional market-based governance.  The industry, however, has abandoned collaborative 
forms of governance to return to its historical roots towards more vertical integration. 
Research limitations/implications: Findings are only relevant in the context of the investigated industry.   
Practical implications: In certain industrial settings managers should consider the promise of collaboration and 
trust with cautious. 
Originality/value:  The data set supports Williamson's (1993) rejection of trust as a mode of governance and calls 
for a more careful delineation of the conditions of recourse to trust in managerial situations. 
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Introduction 
A key issue in complex design and build engineering projects is to balance the search for 
efficiency (usually derived from comparative advantage effects along the supply chain) with the 
management of the vulnerability creating by depending on others.  For example, Berger et al. 
(2004) and Berger and Zeng (2005) use decision analysis to find the optimal number of suppliers 
to work with in order to balance the trade-off between the operating costs of multiple suppliers 
and the financial losses associated with excessive dependence.  Similarly, research dealing with 
supplier switching decisions (e.g., Wagner and Friedl, 2007) concerns itself with discovering 
when dependence has led to poor efficiency.  The key managerial challenge is to find the right 
supply chain configuration and governance regime so that increasing one’s exposure to 
vulnerability from a supplier’s doing does result in increased performance (Barringer and 
Harrison, 2000).   
Embedded in the search for a solution to this trade-off is a question about the role of 
collaboration and trust as mechanisms to deal with dependence.  This topic was first the subject 
of a rich conceptual literature promoting trust and collaboration within supply chains in order to 
improve performance (Barratt, 2004; Sahay, 2003; Handfield and Bechtel, 2002; Simtupang and 
Sridham, 2004; Skott-Larson et al., 2003), and captured by Chen and Paulraj's (2004) conclusion 
that  'relationships based on cooperation and trust are more likely to survive in the marketplace'.   
These conceptual papers led to a large numbers of empirical studies investigating the benefits of 
collaborative versus transactional relationships (Whipple et al., 2010), power and trust as 
antecedents to collaboration/commitment (Johnston et al., 2004; Benton and Maloni, 2005; Zhao 
et al., 2008).  This body of literature can be summarised by stating that support is found for 
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nurturing supply chain relationship capital in order to improve corporate performance.   
However, authors acknowledge that these findings are based on large scale cross-sectional 
surveys when the phenomena under study are actually highly contingent (e.g. Johnson et al., 
2004).  This weakness is explored in conceptual or qualitative research papers where the theory 
of supply chain as relational advantage is being challenged (Spekman and Carraway, 2006; 
Emberson and Story, 2006).  For example, McCutcheon and Stuart (2000) state that 'supplier 
alliances have been widely touted but there are probably a limited number of situations when 
they are applicable'. 
Most empirical work in supply chain management research is typically about supply chain 
serving consumers markets and including several manufacturing facilities best characterised as 
mass production facilities, i.e. repetitive manufacturing systems.  The repetitive or platform-
based nature of the work which is performed means that there are ample opportunities for 
learning curves and fine-tuning the organisational processes at stake (demand management, 
manufacturing, multi-echelon inventory management, and distribution).  Not all manufacturing 
systems can be described through these specifications though.   
This paper focuses on manufacturing systems laying at the opposite end of the product-process 
matrix, an industry commonly referred to as Engineered-to-Order (ETO, Hicks et al., 2000).  
Work typically starts with the innovative design of a one-of-a-kind complex product system and 
is followed by the manufacturing, assembly, testing and fine-tuning of the product before 
delivery.  This industry involves discrete rather than flowline manufacturing processes, it 
operates in business-to-business rather than business-to-consumer markets, and it typically 
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involves a short and broad supply chain network (managed through project management) rather 
than a long and narrow supply chain involving simpler transactions. 
Many ETO organisations have embraced the lessons regarding the role of collaboration and trust 
in inter-organisational systems even though these lessons were formulated in a very different 
context.  The purposes of this paper are to observe the evolutionary history of how a specific 
industry has managed its supply chain in terms of governance regimes and to answer the 
following questions:  To what extent, and when, was a recourse to the concepts of collaboration 
and trust made?  How successful have been the different governance regimes and what are the 
lessons that can be drawn from the history of this industry? 
Methodology 
This paper uses a cladistics methodology.  Initially used in linguistics and evolutionary biology, 
cladistics has previously been applied to the study of the evolution of manufacturing systems 
(McCarthy and Tsinopoulos, 2003; Leseure, 2002; Leseure, 2000; McCarthy et al., 2000) and 
more recently to supply chains (Rose-Anderssen et al., 2009).   It is important to note that in the 
field of organisational systematics (McKelvey, 1978), a cladistics methodology is a general 
classification (a taxonomy) rather than a special classification (a typology).  In special 
classifications, the objective is to observe the diversity of occurrences of a single or very few  
classificatory variables.  For example, one could study trust within supply chains and produce a 
typology of how different groups of firms perceive and use the concept of trust.  In contrast, a 
general classification, or taxonomy, is based on a large list of classificatory variables and is 
concerned with the discovery of patterns and structure, i.e. commonly occurring archetypes of 
specimens presenting the same characteristics.  This is why in an organisational research context, 
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cladistics as a classification technique is suitable for contingency theory research, as the outcome 
of the classifications, the 'species', are akin to organisational configurations (Leseure, 2000).   
In terms of analysis, and although based on an classification algorithm, a cladistic classification 
remains based on the principle of likelihood (i.e. the classification is the most likely given the 
dataset; Leseure, 2000) and thus, it is best described as a qualitative research methodology based 
on interpretation.   
Finally, from a methodological viewpoint, it is important to clearly define the scope of an 
evolutionary classification.  It is a general longitudinal classification whose scope is to study 
diversity: in this case the evolution over time of the mechanisms and arrangements through 
which transactions and relations with suppliers are handled.   
Although the role of trust and collaboration were highlighted in the introduction, no hypotheses 
nor propositions are made regarding these concepts.  They will be used as classification 
variables, amongst others, to build an evolutionary history.  As such this paper inscribes itself in 
Williamson's call for research: 'more microanalytic attention to the processes through which 
trading relationships evolve is indeed a rewarding research enterprise' (Williamson, 1993, p. 
474).  In terms of methodological process, a classification is a research phase that precedes 
theory development, i.e. hypothesis or propositions can only be formulated once classification 
results are available, not before.   
Unit of Analysis 
The ETO industry was described briefly in the introduction.  The data used in this paper focuses 
on the French customised machine design industry (“Machines Spéciales”).   
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The unit of analysis are supply chain project configurations, defined as commonly observable 
archetypes of  organisational characteristics displayed by the project organisation undertaking a 
machine design project.  A typical project organisation, or organisational breakdown structure 
(Turner, 2000), is likely to include different legal forms of organisations working together 
towards the completion of the project's product.  In other words, the supply chain project 
configurations under study are based on the view of 'projects as organisations' (Van Donk and 
Molloy, 2008) and therefore they will be referred to as project organisations in the rest of this 
paper.   
These project organisations typically involve: 
• A final customer which is a production facility ordering a machine with unique and 
new features.  The level of technological risk and product complexity are high to very 
high. 
• A machine designer, whose function is to design the machine, to draw blueprints and 
to prepare a bill of materials and all the machine documentation. 
• An automation designer, whose function is to design, document, install, and program 
the control system of the machine. 
• An assembler, involved with the assembly of the different components. 
• A system integrator or project management team, with the responsibility of tuning the 
machine to production specifications (testing, overhaul, improvements). 
• Technology providers that supply standardised components or modules such as 
feeding devices, robotic systems, vision systems, etc. 
• Other suppliers of standards parts: materials, parts, motors, etc. 
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Data Collection and Analysis 
The data was collected through a mix of observations and interviews (structured and 
unstructured).  The author worked full time in this industry for 3 years but has generally been 
involved with it for 10 years.  Therefore, a fair portion of the data used is based on work 
experience, and discussions and unstructured interviews that took place during or after working 
in this industry.  It is important to remember that the ETO industry works on the basis of discrete 
projects and thus the data collection process may be described as compiling project histories, a 
process which includes speaking and interacting with the different stakeholders in a project.  The 
dataset is composed of 29 projects, and overall, the data collected spans more than 20 years of 
industry history.   
The data collection and analysis process was based on McCarthy et al. (2000, p. 83) suggested 
steps for building an evolutionary classification with cladistics: 
1. Select the manufacturing clade. 
2. Determine the characters. 
3. Code characters. 
4. Establish character polarity. 
5. Construct conceptual classification. 
6. Construct factual classification. 
7. Taxa nomenclature. 
As stated earlier, the objective of the procedure is to extract the most likely evolutionary 
structure given the data set; yet most of the procedure is about constructing the data set itself.  
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This is why in practical terms, the procedure shown above is not a linear step wise process but is 
more similar to the spiral model of software design.  This means that the procedure is applied 
once to produce a conceptual 'first draft' classification (this was mostly based on the author's 
personal knowledge of the industry).  Once this prototype classification is finished, the actual 
project histories were compiled (this is the stage at which project managers were asked to fill in 
questionnaires about the characteristics and performance of their projects). This data is then used 
to produce the factual classification and the differences between the factual and conceptual 
classification structures are analysed.  At this point, more data may be needed or data may have 
to recoded.  This is when unstructured interviews with project managers took place. 
For a full account of the cladistics methodology, see McCarthy et al. (2000, pp. 83-89).  In the 
interest of space, only key steps in the process of discussed here.  The process used to select and 
code the characters is discussed in the next section.  All classification work was done with the 
PHYLogeny Inference Package (PHYLIP) software (Felsenstein, 2013).  The analysis itself was 
done through a multiple character states Wagner parsimony algorithm.  The purpose of this 
algorithm is to suggest an evolutionary history which is the most parsimonious in terms of the 
number of capabilities acquisition steps that it requires.  In other words, it makes the assumption 
that firms evolve efficiently toward fitter states.  Each of the 29 project histories were then 
allocated to the different configurations suggested by the cladistics configuration at the stage of 
reconciliation between the conceptual and factual classification.   
In this paper, the traditional construction of an evolutionary history of the industry according to 
the procedure shown above was followed by a comparative performance analysis of the different 
configuration.  For each project, data about project performance, equity (fair sharing of profits 
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between project partners), trust (was the project done in a climate of trust?), learning (were 
significant and valuable lessons learned through the execution of the project?), and risk was 
collected.  All projects were scored by key personnel (project managers, top managers) and 
averages for all projects within a configuration are computed to compare performance. 
Character Selection and Coding 
The list of characters, shown in table 1, was built by extracting key variables from the supply 
chain management literature dealing with relational advantage and supply chain performance. 
In order to model the traits of different project organisations the most logical starting point is 
transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985; 1991).    Transaction cost economics focuses on 
the identification of the best mode of governance (character 1 in table 1) so that the cost of 
managing transactions between firms is minimised.  Transaction cost theory is concerned with 
two key behavioural variables: bounded rationality and opportunism (Williamson, 1993).  
Bounded rationality means that there are natural cognitive limits to the ability of managers to 
make rational decisions.  Opportunism is concerned with an arm’s length party's propensity to 
seek their own self-interest.  Williamson proposes three governance modes, which in cladistics' 
terminology are the character states for character 1: hierarchical control (internalising the 
activity and controlling operations through a traditional hierarchical power structure), relying on 
markets (and contracts), or relying on hybrid organisational modes.  The hybrid organisational 
mode tries to capture the strengths of internalisation whilst avoiding the costs/commitments 
associated with it.  Research in transaction cost economics has shown that in practice, hybrid 
organisational forms can take many forms (e.g. partnerships, franchising, complex contracting 
forms; Shelanski and Klein, 1995).     
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Characters States Comments Relevant Concepts and 
Literature 
1- Governance 
Mode 
0- Hierarchical 
control 
Control of supply is achieved through 
internalization. 
Transaction cost theory 
(Williamson, 1993, 2008; Kwon 
and Suh, 2004, Wu et al., 2012) 
and hybrid governance mode 
(Shelanski and Klein, 1995) 
 
 
1- Market 
Control 
Market mechanisms are used to control 
and obtain the best supply.  Use of 
bidding process, supplier's audit, learning 
from previous orders, switching real 
options. 
2- Hybrid 
control 
Control is achieved both through market 
mechanisms, relational capital, and 
normative values. 
2- Contract 
Management 
0-Internal 
orders 
Can easily be reviewed and updated in 
internal meetings. 
Contracting (Williamson, 1993, 
2008; Handfield and Bechtel, 
2002) and transactional supply 
chain relations (Whipple et al., 
2010) 
1- Formal 
contracts 
Are used to manage the relationship and 
to set expected product specifications. 
2- Very formal 
contracts. 
Contracts are extremely exhaustive.  Their 
preparation is expensive, and so is 
complying to them.  Specifications can 
reach up to 500 pages. 
3- Power Basis 0- Legitimate Natural exploitation of human capital and 
know-who in a firm.  Based on legitimate 
forms of coercive power. 
Power bases to supply chain 
relationships (Whipple et al., 
2010; McCutcheon and Stuart, 
2000; Zhao et al., 2008) 
Trust-power climate (Ireland 
and Webb, 2007).  
Bargaining power (Crook and 
Combs, 2007) 
 
1- Legal Procedure driven and documented in 
process/project documentation.  Activities 
are controlled through legal forms of 
coercive power. 
2- Non 
coercive 
Activities are controlled through expert, 
referent, or rewarding forms of power. 
4- Experience 
Curves 
0- Application 
focused 
Experience is accumulated about 
automation of processes in a specific 
industrial sector. 
Experience curves (Johnston 
and Chambers, 2000) 
Focused differentiation strategy 
(Porter, 1985) 
Supply chain learning (Bessant 
et al., 2003) 
Customer focus (Spekman and 
Carraway, 2006) 
Relational advantage (Chen and 
Paulraj, 2004) and history of 
positive interactions 
(McCutcheon and Stuart, 2000). 
Technological aspects of 
transaction (McCutcheon and 
Stuart, 2000). 
Trust as the enabler of 
relational transactions 
(Spekman and Carraway, 2006; 
Handfield and Bechtel, 2002; 
Johnston et al., 2004) 
 
1- Generic Experience is about machine design, and 
can be deployed in a broad range of 
industries. 
2- System 
Integration 
Experience is about integrated machine 
design (co-ordinating the key design 
functions)  
3a- Relational 
(trust based) 
Experience about system integration is 
supplemented by relational ability as 
different parties need to transfer key 
product/process knowledge. 
3b- 
Technology 
focused 
Integration experience is focused on a 
specific technological domain, which is a 
core competency of the system integrator. 
(Note: 3a and 3b are mutually exclusive) 
Postscript Version.  Original available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/JMTM-03-2013-0027.  
Quote as Leseure, M., (2015) "Trust in manufacturing engineering project systems: an evolutionary perspective", Journal of 
Manufacturing Technology Management, Vol. 26, No. 7, pp. 1013-1030. 
 
11 
 
Characters States Comments Relevant Concepts and 
Literature 
5- 
Communication 
0 - Internal Internal communication channels Communication, information 
sharing, and other forms of co-
ordination as standard variables 
to model supply chain 
management processes 
(Whipple et al., 2010, Spekman 
and Carraway, 2006, Nyaga et 
al., 2010). 
Processes as a transition driver 
(Spekman and Carraway, 2006) 
 
1-Formal Formal and hierarchical 
2- Cross 
lateral 
Cross lateral communication allow cross 
lateral co-ordination. 
6 - Socialisation 0- High Naturally occurring in project teams. Formal and informal 
socialisation processes (Cousins 
et al., 2006) 
1- Difficult Formality and potential tension in the 
relationship hampers inter-organisational 
socialization. 
2- Encouraged Through initiatives such as outplacement 
and workers exchanges. 
7 – Commitment 
of first tier 
0- Internalized There are no first tier suppliers. Collaborative forms of supply 
chain work lead to commitment 
(Nyaga et al., 2010) 
Commitment to relationships 
(Kwon and Suh, 2004,2005) 
Site specific asset and human 
specific assets (Handfield and 
Bechtel, 2002) 
Instrumental vs. normative 
commitment (Zhao et al., 2008) 
Cooperative relationship 
behaviours (Johnston et al., 
2004) 
Conflict resolution (Benton and 
Maloni, 2005) 
 
1- Contractual First tier suppliers perform the terms of a 
contract 
2- 
Collaborative 
First tier is committed to relationship and 
engage wilfully in collaboration 
8- Commitment 
of second tier 
0 - 
Internalized 
 
 
Same as character 7. 1-Contractual 
2- 
Collaborative 
9- Commitment 
of third tier 
0- Contractual 
1- 
Collaborative 
10- Risk 0 – 
Concentrated 
on a unique 
echelon 
(client) 
Maps and allocates a project's risks onto 
the different members of a supply chain 
configuration (see figure 2). 
Dynamism of input technology, 
hostages, forecasted 
technological discontinuities 
(McCutcheon and Stuart, 2000). 
Reward/cost sharing (Whipple 
et al., 2010) 
Fear of opportunism (Ireland 
and Webb, 2007) 
Vulnerability (Handfield and 
Nichols, 2002) 
Buyer dependence (Handfield 
and Bechtel, 2002) 
 
1 – 
Concentrated 
on a unique 
echelon 
(system 
integrator) 
2- Distributed 
along the 
supply chain 
Table 1.  List of Characters 
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In relation to the collaborative supply chain literature, markets are what Whipple et al. (2010) 
refer to a transactional relationships whereas hybrid are referred to as collaborative relationships. 
The next step in a cladistics analysis is to code the polarity of the character states, i.e. to indicate 
whether a character is ancestral or derived.  The industry's history shows that historically the 
production of the ETO machines were handled in house and it is only with the outsourcing wave 
of the 1980/90s that the market mode started to be used.  Therefore, the hierarchical mode is 
coded as the ancestral state (state 1-0) and market and hybrid are coded as derived ones (states 1-
1 and 1-2).  Note that in table 1 and in the multiple character states Wagner parsimony algorithm 
used to analyse the data, no further evolutionary constraints are specified.  In other words an 
ancestral configuration possessing state 1-0 can stay in this state or can evolve into either 1-1 or 
1-2, and both 1-1 and 1-2 can evolve into each other or revert back to the ancestral state.  
Transaction cost theory is often described as the science of contracting as contracts are the prime 
mechanism for co-ordination in the market mode.  This is why character 2 observes the types of 
contracts which are used within the project organisation.  
Whilst characters 1 and 2 are tangible and objective characteristics of the project organisations 
the collaborative supply chain literature uses more abstract concepts to predict the performance 
of supply chain.  One such abstract variable is the distribution of power across different members 
of a supply chain (character 3; Whipple et al., 2010; McCutcheon and Stuart, 2000; Zhao et al., 
2008).    Often the research literature is either about trust or power, but Ireland and Webb (2007) 
and Blomviqst et al. (2005) suggest that trust and power can co-exist as governance levers.   
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Trust is a second common abstract research variable in supply chain performance research and is 
reported to be an enabler of relational transactions (Spekman and Carraway, 2006; Handfield and 
Bechtel, 2002; Johnston et al., 2004).  Trust can be defined as  the 'actor’s expectation of the 
other party’s capability, goodwill and self-reference in future situations involving risk and 
vulnerability’ (Blomqvist et al., 2005, p. 500).   
In transaction cost theory, trust is not conceptualised as a sustainable governance construct 
(Williamson, 1993).  This exclusion of trust has been one of the main source of criticisms of 
transaction cost theory (Grover and Malohtra, 2003; Nooteboom, 2009), and this, despite 
Williamson's insistent conclusion that '[...] it is redundant at best and can be misleading to use 
the term "trust" to describe commercial exchange' (Williamson, 1993, p. 463).  It is for this 
reason that trust was not coded as a separate character in table 1 but instead only as a character 
state of a more general character observing the existence of organisational-level learning curves 
or experience curves (character 4, Chambers and Johnston, 2000) with a supply chain learning 
context (Bessant et al., 2003; Spekman et al., 2002).   
The ancestral state of character 4 is a project organisation benefiting from application-specific 
experience curves, e.g. specialising in the design and building of assembly machines for 
automotive electrical connectors (state 4-0).  A project organisation may decide that it has also 
accumulated generic machine design skills and seek new markets where these skills can be 
deployed.  If this is done successfully, the project organisations is benefiting from further 
learning curve effects from different industries (state 4-1).  This state is however exposing the 
project organisation to risk every time it ventures in new sectors.  The response of project 
organisations to this challenge is to capitalise on their learning curves and to rationalise their 
Postscript Version.  Original available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/JMTM-03-2013-0027.  
Quote as Leseure, M., (2015) "Trust in manufacturing engineering project systems: an evolutionary perspective", Journal of 
Manufacturing Technology Management, Vol. 26, No. 7, pp. 1013-1030. 
 
14 
 
contractual promises by promoting themselves as systems' integrators (state 4-2), i.e. as 
possessing the ability to lead a project to a successful completion through superior business 
processes.  In other words, whereas the evolution from 4-0 to 4-1 was about the scope of the 
underlying technical domain, the evolution from 4-1 to 4-2 is about management capability.  
Character 10, which looks at the organisational distribution of risks, provides further information 
about the practical impact of this evolutionary step on the allocation of risks within the project 
organisation.   
The fact that learning within project organisations is taking place along two dimensions, the 
technical/product and process domains, is further captured by an additional set of evolutionary 
steps with character states 4-3a and 4-3b.  4-3a is about organisations that decide to adopt a 
focused differentiation strategy (Porter, 1985) to better exploit and commercialise their system's 
integrator knowledge.  4-3b is about organisations that chose not to follow this specialisation 
route and decide to face the risks of one-off innovative projects by using trust to completely rely 
on their partners to cope with unforeseen project issues, i.e. organisations seeking a genuine 
'relational advantage' (Chen and Paulraj, 2004).  This coding of trust is consistent with 
Nooteboom (2009) who reaches the conclusions that trust is an essential condition for the 
processes of learning, adaption, and innovation to take place. 
A third key abstract variable of supply chain performance literature is commitment, which is 
frequently causally associated with trust through Morgan and Hunt's (1994) trust-commitment 
theory positing that trust is an antecedent to commitment to a cooperative relationship behaviour 
resulting in increased performance (Kwon and Suh, 2004, 2005; Johnston et al., 2004, Wu et al., 
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2012).  Characters 7 to 9 describes the level of commitment of different tiers of the supply chain 
within the project organisations.  
Character 5 observes communication practices in the project organisations consistently with the 
literature highlighting the importance of this variable (Whipple et al., 2010, Spekman and 
Carraway, 2006; Nyaga et al., 2010) and character 6 describes the extent to which socialisation 
takes place within the project organisation (Cousins et al., 2006). 
 
Evolutionary History 
Figure 1 presents an evolutionary history of supply chain configurations in the French machine 
design industry.  The bottom line represents the six key configurations which have been, or are 
still in use, in this industry.  The horizontal numbered bars on the tree represents the different 
capabilities which are needed to move from one configuration to another.   
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Figure 1 – Evolutionary History of the ‘Machines Spéciales’ Industry 
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When asked where the special machine industry originated, individuals with a long experience in 
the industry associate its existence with a move away from vertical integration.  Thus, the 
ancestral species of the tree, Internal Suppliers (1), means that customers have an internal 
division in charge of the design and manufacture of their production machines.  Control is 
hierarchical and co-ordination straightforward to implement (assuming no divisional rifts or 
interfacing problems).  These internal suppliers exhibit good application-specific experience 
curves, but suffer from a lack of cognitive distance when compared to firms operating on several 
types of applications.  The major problem of these Internal Suppliers is capacity management.  
Internal Suppliers made a high investment in fixed costs and skilled workforce, but their demand 
is extremely volatile.  Thus, their capacity tends to be alternatively under- and over-utilised. 
It is the high cost of these divisions and the desire to focus on core competencies which drove 
firms to seek other modes of working.  In the 1980s, firms moved to the Specialised Suppliers 
(2) configuration.  The practice exhibited at this time was a perfect illustration of the market 
mode of governance.  Take the example of a firm specialising in designing and manufacturing 
electronics connectors.  These firms would make the decision to keep connector design as a core 
competency. However, machine design for assembly purposes is not a core competency and is a 
costly activity: it should be outsourced.  The design of a machine should be subcontracted to a 
design office.  The controls side should be subcontracted to another specialist, and so on.    
By the 1990s nearly but not all end users had switched from the first configuration to the second.  
The supporting capabilities in configuration  (2) are to rely on market control mechanisms, the 
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use of formal contract and project specifications, procedure-driven processes and co-ordination, 
and the ability to tap into a very diverse knowledge base. 
There are few firms which still operate along these lines today.  This can simply be explained by 
the fact that too often, firms failed to obtain working machinery at the end of the project!  These 
firms learned at their expenses that too much dependence on a supplier could have dramatic 
financial consequences, as when overall supply chain efficiency collapsed, it was them, the final 
customer, who bore the highest risk consequence.  For example, in one of the projects in the 
dataset, a customer subcontracted the design and building phases to two different firms.  The 
blueprints were delivered to the customer and then passed onto the builder.  The assembled 
machine was delivered but was unable to produce any parts.  The builder blamed a poor design, 
and the designer a poor quality of built.  Due to the cost of production delays and penalties 
imposed by the customer’s customer, and to fears of a long and unsuccessful litigation process, 
the customer decided to subcontract the modification of the machine to another independent 
supplier, a solution which brought a significant and unplanned cost to the project.   
The demographic demise of configuration (2) shows that in an attempt to reduce production 
costs, transaction costs crept up due to project vulnerability.  The co-ordination of a large set of 
suppliers required more capabilities than client firms currently had.  This was addressed by 
switching orders away from multiple suppliers to a unique first-tier supplier which would act as a 
system integrator.  Project management and cross-functional integration are the key core 
competencies of this integrator.  Firms that never experimented with configuration (2) evolved 
into configuration (3a): in these, the client retained responsibility for the project but 
subcontracted all operations to a system builder, that took responsibility for co-ordinating the 
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second tier of suppliers.  Customers who had relied on market mechanisms to access cheaper 
design and assembly services (configuration 2) now relied on the market to access system 
integration expertise.  An important consequence of this new configuration, Pivotal Supply 
Chains (3b), is that the risk of failure had been passed down to the first-tier.  Any penalty or cost 
incurred by the customer due to a project failure could be passed down the supply chain by 
detailed contractual agreements.  This third configuration became the dominant mode of 
business, and many companies still operate today in this configuration.  Needless to say, the 
price of this co-ordination service is not cheap as the level of risk assumed is extremely high. 
One of the features that explain the success of the configuration is the fact that for the first time, 
a central pivot became a repository of knowledge about both the technical and co-ordination 
aspects of the project.  Thus, previous solutions (technological or managerial) could be reused 
with another customer.  This learning capability provided Pivotal Supply Chains with a 
knowledge base and insight that could not be matched by Specialised Suppliers.  
The existence of two additional configurations, which have been increasingly used since the late 
1990s, shows that there was yet more progress to be made in terms of improving the overall 
efficiency of supply chains in this industry.  The common characteristic of configurations 4 and 5 
in figure 1 is the collective acknowledgement that in a supply chain, it is a suboptimal practice to 
concentrate all the risks on one single echelon.  If this is case, this simply means that transaction 
costs increase as litigations in this industry are long, complex, and expensive matters.  Thus, 
configurations 4 and 5 are based on the principle that as all echelons can contribute to problems 
in a supply chain, each should be held accountable for their wrong-doing.  However, 4 and 5 
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display a bifurcation point in evolutionary history, i.e. two mutually exclusive solutions to the 
same problem. 
The first alternative, Collaborative Supply Chains (4), make the implicit assumption that 
transferring all the risk to the supply pivot is an inadequate management decision.  These supply 
chains believe that collaborative work practices are the way to better control and collectively 
manage risk, and thus to diffuse it.  Examples of collaborative work practices which were 
observed in the case studies are: 
• Outplacement of designers: from suppliers to the customer sites, or vice versa. 
• Rotating project management across partners, 
• Strategic alliances, 
• Open-book and/or profit sharing agreement within operations network, 
• Joint planning, control, and scheduling, 
• Joint reception of technical component, including joint test runs. 
This configuration  is also characterised by the fact that deadlines and budgets are inherently 
more flexible, as it is most likely that the joint recognition of mutual errors will create a positive 
ground for work plan revisions.   
The second alternative is borne precisely from a general distrust about the feasibility of 
collaboration in a business environment and about the feasibility of controlling the equity of 
distribution of benefits along the supply chain.  Vertically Integrated Suppliers (5) handle the 
level of risks which is passed down from configuration 2 to 3 by vertically integrating their own 
first tier suppliers.  Thus, the risk from poor communications and poor interfaces is greatly 
reduced as it is contained to the interfaces with the customers and third-tier suppliers.  However 
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it should be noted that Vertically Integrated Suppliers tend to restrict their product and service 
offerings to generic applications or technologies.  This focused innovation strategy means that 
they have also reduced the technological and transaction risk that their firms face.  Vertically 
Integrated Suppliers used their strategic focus, experience, and accurate control systems to face 
litigious customers when needed.  This stands at odds with the industry custom, where generally, 
suppliers complain from the opposite practice, i.e. large customers taking them to litigation 
battles.  Vertically Integrated Suppliers provide some unique instances of the suppliers taking the 
customer to court and winning the case.  Figure 2 summarises the key characteristics of the 
different configurations. 
Discussion 
A short summary of the evolutionary history of the industry is that originally vertically integrated 
operations in configuration 1 were outsourced to project managers (configuration 3b) who had to 
vertically integrate their own suppliers in order to operate sustainably (configuration 5). 
The evolutionary history of this industry further reveals that trust was at once viewed as the 
central ingredient towards a new way of managing project in configuration 4.  The adoption of 
collaborative practices, the will to turn around often adversarial relationships, and the diminished 
emphasis on formal contracts were all consistent with the supply chain management literature 
positive view of trust.  In the context of the ETO industry discussed in this paper, trust as a 
management value became increasingly viewed critically by managers. 
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Figure 2: The Different Configurations. 
Black arrows represent the flow of products and red arrows the flow of orders/complex contracts.  The echelon fully 
responsible for the project is shown in bold. 
 
 
 The fact that configuration 4, Collaborative Supply Chains, was a tentative governance practice 
that was eventually rejected by industry is confirmed when interviewing managers who 
acknowledge that abandoning this configuration was a conscious choice.  The projects that make 
up configuration 4 are often good examples of the costs and risks associated with excess trust 
and 'overembeddeness' (Ireland and Webb, 2007).  This confirms the view of Spekman and 
Carraway (2006) who state that 'we do not advocate collaborative relationships in all buyer-
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seller relationships'  and Emberson and Storey's (2006) critique of the normative buyer-supplier 
literature.   Emberson and Storey (2006) argue that this literature fails to take into account the 
complex and dispersed nature of collaboration within an organisational context.  In other words, 
respondents to surveys may accept the normative elegance of concepts such as trust and 
collaboration, but their ability to exploit these sustainably in a complex and dynamic 
organisational context may be impaired for a variety of organisational and behavioural reasons. 
The conclusion about the cost of over-embeddedness experienced by configuration 4 answers the 
cost side of  Williamson's (2008) question about the role of trust in supply chains: 'Transaction 
cost economics eschews appeal to user-friendly concepts such as the illusive concept of trust.  
What benefits accrue to the more widespread use of trust amongst SCM practitioners? What are 
the costs?'.   
Further analysis of the different projects within each species provides a tentative answer to the 
benefit part of Williamson's question as occasionally more was learned in projects explicitly 
based on trust.  This is shown in table 2 when considering not only the learning scores but their 
standard deviation (in other words, projects in configuration 4 were either learning success or 
outright failures when things went wrong).  
The fact that the average learning score of configuration 4 is lower than configuration 5 should 
be mitigated by putting these projects in their historical context.  In the data set, the time at 
which some firms designed their project according to configuration 4 more or less always 
followed a desired to grow activities away from configuration 3b.   
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Configuration Project 
performance 
Equity Trust Risk Learning 
(2) Specialised 
Suppliers 
45 47 48 54 46 
(3a) Client-led 
pivotal supply 
chains 
74 70 56 24 56 
(3b) Contractor-
led pivotal supply 
chain 
75 50 44 68 53 
(4) Collaborative 
supply chains 
47 44 32 83 61 (σ=33) 
(5) Vertically 
integrated 
suppliers 
73 64 53 64 69 (σ=17) 
Table 2.  Managers' Perception of Different Configurations' Characteristics (all score on a 100 points 
scale) 
 
Configuration 3b is a market-based supply chain, and thus fast growth would only be possible by 
working with more subcontractors.  It would be difficult to cope with the resulting increase in 
governance costs though.  Thus configuration 4 was an attempt at stimulating growth whilst 
avoiding both the high investment required in configuration 5 and transaction costs of 3b.  
Almost invariably, firms expanded their customer base aggressively in order to fuel growth.  
This resulted in riskier than normal projects being taken on board (and the highest average risk 
score in table 2).  Many failed and resulted in bitter disputes within the trust-based 
configurations.  In some of the projects in the dataset, the legal liability incurred when not being 
able to deliver a technically satisfactory product when trust led to overembeddeness resulted in 
several firms filing for bankruptcy.  The difficulty in establishing returns from trust is consistent 
with the observation that 'familiarity breeds trust' (Gulati, 1995).  Routine and familiarity are not 
common characteristics of ETO industries, especially when aggressive growth programmes are 
adopted. 
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Conclusion 
The persistent scholarly tradition of promoting trust and collaboration in supply chains and 
project management systems can be explained by two factors: (1) trust is a positive concept 
associated with an intuitively elegant and appealing way of running operations and (2) the fact 
that the literature on supply chain management tends to be based on routine, long, shallow, and 
mostly linear supply chains where 'familiarity breeds trust'.   
This paper investigates trust in complex and high risk manufacturing engineering projects.  The 
supply chains that are involved are fundamentally different than those that are traditionally 
researched.  The conclusion is that in the ETO context, or more specifically in the industry 
researched in this paper, managers take exception to the literature and not only view trust as a 
misleading but also as a potential dangerous governance lever.  Both the evolutionary data set 
used in this paper and the opinions expressed by the respondents provide strong support for 
Williamson's thesis (1993) that the recourse to trust in commercial transaction unnecessarily 
distorts one's perception of effective governance modes.  This paper provides supporting 
evidence that collaborative relationships based on trust are not a sustainable solution for all 
supply chains (McCutcheon and Stuart, 2000; Emberson and Storey, 2006; Spekman and 
Carraway, 2006) and provides an actual example of firms that have experienced the 
disadvantages of excess trust (Ireland and Webb, 2007).   These findings highlight the contingent 
nature of the effectiveness of trust for both researchers and practitioners.  More research 
documenting the contexts and situations in which trust works, or does not work, is needed to 
provide managers with more robust recommendations for the management of their supply chains.   
Research Implications 
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This paper inscribes itself in a debate between the empirical trust-performance supply chain 
literature (Benton and Maloni, 2005; Cousins et al., 2006; Johnston et al., 2004; Nyaga et al., 
2010; Whipple et al., 2010), which concludes that trust and collaboration lead to higher levels of 
supply chain performance and the critical conceptual literature disagreeing with this notion 
(McCutcheon and Stuart, 2000; Emberson and Storey, 2006; Spekman and Carraway, 2006).  
The first contribution of this paper is to present a counter-example to the conclusions of the first 
school and to therefore provide support for the second school.  The second contribution of this 
paper is to highlight the difference between research asking (1) how does trust lead to higher 
supply chain performance from (2) in which contexts does trust work as an hybrid governance 
mode?  This difference is akin to that between functional science and systematics (the science of 
diversity).  McKelvey (1982, p. 19) states that 'systematics is prerequisite to good scientific 
method because it directly affects an investigator's ability to [attain high quality knowledge] '.   It 
is only through a better understanding of when and where trust works in supply chains (question 
2 above, the locus of this paper) that we can perform functional studies of how trust works 
(question 1 above). 
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